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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 08-1460
_____________
TASIM MAKASHI, 
                     Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
                             Respondent
On Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A96-248-753)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Henry S. Dogin
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 29, 2009
BEFORE: FISHER, CHAGARES, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
(Filed   July 14, 2009 )
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Tasim Makashi petitions for review of a final order of removal issued by the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  The BIA affirmed the decision of the Immigration
Makashi also alleges that while the Communist Party was in power, he and his1
family were held in an internment camp from 1967-1991.  While the Socialist Party was
in power in 1998, Makashi alleges that he was once again mistreated:  he was fired from
his job, and he was questioned about his membership in the Democratic Party and beaten
and held by the police.  He also alleges that he attended a political rally in October of
2000, and that while he was coming home from that event, he was detained and beaten.
2
Judge (“IJ”) denying Makashi’s petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  We will deny his petition for review.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, we will only briefly summarize the
essential facts.  Makashi, a native of Albania, seeks asylum and withholding of removal
based on past political persecution and fear of future persecution, as well as relief under
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  He claims that while still in Albania, he was
persecuted because of his political beliefs — his membership in and support of the
Democratic Party.   He relies heavily on an incident that allegedly occurred on September1
14, 1998, in which explosives were detonated within Makashi’s home, damaging it as
well as causing him serious injuries.  He does not know who planted the explosives.  As
corroborating evidence of the explosion, Makashi submitted a report from Dr. Alfred
Tusha, which references an explosion on September 14, 1998, but states that Makashi was
examined on October 8, 1998.  Makashi also argues that Vili Minarolli, a leader in the
Democratic Party, was aware of the bombing, but a letter submitted by him does not
reference it.  Appendix (App.) 425.  Makashi left Albania in 2002 and fled to the United
3States, where he applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the CAT.
The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Makashi’s claim, finding that he was not
credible.  In making this finding, the IJ relied on numerous pieces of evidence: (1) Dr.
Tusha’s report states that Makashi was examined October 8, not in September, and there
was no further corroborating evidence about his beatings; (2) Minarolli’s letter, which did
not reference the bombing, was unpersuasive; and (3) the Country Condition Reports
showed that there was generalized violence in Albania in the late 1990's, and the
explosion could have been just an instance of generalized violence rather than political
persecution.  In the alternative, the IJ concluded that even if Makashi was credible, his
claim should be denied based on changed country conditions.  Finally, the IJ found no
basis to grant Makashi relief under the CAT.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, concluding that the IJ’s determination that
Makashi was not credible was not clearly erroneous, because the discrepancy between Dr.
Tusha’s report and Makashi’s claim of when the explosion occurred was “substantial and
central” to Makashi’s claims.  App. 2.  The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s alternative finding
that even if Makashi was credible, and had established past persecution, he was still
ineligible for relief because the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution
had been rebutted due to changed country conditions in Albania.  The BIA also affirmed
the IJ’s decision not to grant Makashi relief under the CAT because he did not
demonstrate that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to
4Albania.  Makashi then filed a petition for review in this Court.
II.
The BIA had authority to review Makashi’s appeal under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1.  This
Court has jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final orders of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
“[W]e uphold the BIA’s factual determinations if they are ‘supported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’ . . . . [W]e can
reject the BIA’s factual findings only if ‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled
to conclude to the contrary.’”  Liu v. Attorney General, 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009). 
An adverse credibility determination is a factual finding which we review under the
substantial evidence standard.  Lin-Zheng v. Attorney General, 557 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir.
2009).  When the BIA “substantially relie[s]” on the IJ’s credibility finding, even though
it only gives “some examples of . . . inconsistencies,” we can review the decision of both
the IJ and the BIA.  Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2004); See also Sandie v.
Attorney General, 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).
III.
The Attorney General may grant asylum or withholding of removal to an alien in
removal proceedings if the alien establishes that he or she is a “refugee” under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a) and (b), 1231(b)(3)(A);
Lin-Zheng, 557 F.3d at 149 n.1; Wong v. Attorney General, 539 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir.
2008).  Under the INA, a “refugee” is defined as “‘any person who is outside any country
5of such person’s nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .’”  Wong, 539 F.3d at
232 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).  
To establish asylum eligibility, a petitioner can demonstrate that he suffered from
past persecution, and, if he does so, that “gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of a well-
founded fear of future persecution.”  Gomez-Zuluaga v. Attorney General, 527 F.3d 330,
341 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Even if an asylum
applicant does not show that he suffered from past persecution, he 
may still qualify for asylum if he shows that he has a well-founded fear of future
persecution on account of a protected ground.  A well-founded fear includes both a
subjective and objective component.  An applicant must show that he has a
subjective fear of persecution that is supported by objective evidence that
persecution is a reasonable possibility.
Shardar v. Attorney General, 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, “a petitioner must ‘establish a
clear probability,’ meaning ‘that it is more likely than not, that he/she would suffer
persecution.’”  Wong, 539 F.3d at 236 (citation omitted).  If an applicant is ineligible for
asylum, he is also ineligible for withholding of removal.  Id. at 236-37.  To establish
eligibility under the CAT, an applicant must show that it is “more likely than not that [he]
The REAL ID Act of 2005, which changed the standard for credibility2
determinations, is not applicable to claims, such as Makashi’s, which were made before
the effective date of the Act.  Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 216 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005).
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will be tortured if removed . . ., and that such torture will occur with the consent or
acquiescence of the government.”  Gomez-Zuluaga, 527 F.3d at 349.
Makashi contends that the IJ erred when it based its adverse credibility finding on
the discrepancy between when Makashi claims the explosion happened (September 14,
1998) and the date of his doctor’s note (October 8, 1998), because this is a minor
inconsistency which does not go to the heart of his asylum claim.  He argues that the rest
of Dr. Tusha’s report corroborates his claim in that it mentions that there was an
explosion at Makashi’s home, that he suffered injuries from it, and that he was
hospitalized for 48 hours on account of it.  See App. 263.  He notes that the IJ erred when
it stated that no family members had corroborated his report of the explosion, because his
mother had sent a letter about it.  See App. 257.  He also claims that the IJ based its
adverse credibility finding on impermissible speculation, because the IJ stated that who
was responsible for the bombing was unknown.
“[M]inor inconsistencies and minor admissions that reveal nothing about an
asylum applicant’s fear for his safety are not an adequate basis for an adverse credibility
finding.  Rather, the discrepancies must involve the heart of the asylum claim.”  Caushi v.
Attorney General, 436 F.3d 220, 229 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted).   Because the BIA substantially relied on the IJ’s adverse2
Although Makashi argues that this letter was offered to show his membership in3
the Democratic Party, and not to “tell of [his] personal acts of suffering,” we find that the
IJ’s conclusion that the letter could have been more detailed about Makashi’s personal
incidents of harm as a result of his membership in the Democratic Party was supported by
substantial evidence.
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credibility finding, we can look to both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions here, and we find that
the adverse credibility finding was based on substantial evidence.  Xie, 359 F.3d at 242.
The IJ determined that Makashi was not credible for a myriad of reasons, not only
because the date on Dr. Tusha’s report differed from the date of the alleged explosion. 
For example, the IJ found it important that Makashi had not submitted any corroborating
evidence, including medical evidence, of other beatings Makashi said he endured, and
that the letter from Minarolli failed to state anything about the bombing or the beatings.  3
The BIA, in turn, found that the difference in the date that Dr. Tusha’s report states
Makashi was examined and the date Makashi alleges the explosion happened, was an
example of a substantial discrepancy found by the IJ.  While the IJ did err in stating that
no corroborating evidence had been submitted by family members, as Makashi’s mother
had submitted a letter regarding the explosion, we are nevertheless not “compelled” by
these findings to reach a contrary credibility determination here.  We conclude that the
decisions below were supported by substantial evidence, and that based on the adverse
credibility finding, Makashi failed to establish past persecution.
However, even if the adverse credibility findings were not supported by substantial
evidence, we would still deny Makashi relief, as we agree with both the BIA and the IJ
8that changed country conditions in Albania constitute a “fundamental change in
circumstances” that rebut any presumption that Makashi has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i) (even if past persecution has been
established, asylum can still be denied if “[t]here has been a fundamental change in
circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in
the applicant’s country of nationality . . . on account of . . . political opinion.”); Leia v.
Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 427, 437 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[E]vidence of changed country conditions
can only rebut an alien’s fear of future persecution based on past persecution if the
evidence addresses ‘the specific basis for the alien’s fear of persecution; generalized
improvements in country conditions will not suffice . . . .’”).  The BIA relied on the 2005 
State Department Report for Albania (the “Report”) in concluding that even if Makashi
had established past persecution, the presumption of future persecution had been rebutted. 
Based on the Report, the BIA found that the Democratic Party was one of the two largest
parties in Albania, with many seats in Parliament, that there were periodic elections, and
that the government “generally respected” citizens’ rights of assembly and association. 
App. 3.  There was nothing in the Report which specifically mentioned violence against
Democratic Party members, and there were “no confirmed cases” of prisoners held solely
for political reasons.  App. 3.  The BIA also explained that while there were problems
with “general human rights abuses” in Albania, nothing indicated that abuses were
perpetrated specifically on account of political party membership.  App. 3.  It therefore
9concluded that Makashi had not established a well-founded fear of persecution.  A review
of the 2005 State Department Report does not compel a contrary conclusion.  We
therefore agree with the BIA’s conclusion that Makashi is not entitled to asylum, and as a
necessary corollary, is not entitled to withholding of removal.
Finally, neither the BIA nor the IJ erred when they found that Makashi had not
established a basis for relief under the CAT, as Makashi did not demonstrate that it is
more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to Albania.  
IV.
Accordingly, we will deny Makashi’s petition for review.
